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Incorporating Diversification into Risk Management
Abstract
Artzner, Delbaen, Eber and Heath (1999) introduce the concept of a coherent risk
measure. However, these measures only allow the addition of riskfree capital to reduce
portfolio risk. In contrast, through portfolio rebalancing, our proposed measure enables
diversification to lower risk. Consequently, the importance of derivative and insurance
contracts to risk management is explicitly recognized. Moreover, we derive the price
of portfolio insurance, a security whose addition to a portfolio ensures its acceptability
to an external regulator. Throughout our analysis, market frictions such as illiquidity
and transaction costs may be incorporated into portfolio rebalancing decisions.
1 Introduction
The question of “how a ﬁrm should measure its risk?” is of fundamental importance to
ﬁnancial practice. According to Modigliani and Miller (1958), risk management policies are
irrelevant. However, market frictions such as bankruptcy costs, managerial incentives, taxes
and costly external ﬁnancing motivate risk management activities (see Stulz (1984), Smith
and Stulz (1985) and Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993)).
Given the wide-spread usage of risk management tools such as Value-at-Risk (VaR),
ﬁrms actively manage risk and are concerned with its measurement. Unfortunately, VaR is
not derived from fundamental economic principles and its usage may lead to economically
sub-optimal decision rules as shown by Shapiro and Basak (2001).
Substantial progress in the academic risk management literature began with Artzner,
Delbaen, Eber and Heath (1999), abbreviated ADEH hereafter, who develop an axiomatic
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framework for risk measurement. Their axioms stem from intuitive economic principles
that deﬁne a coherent risk measure. The intent of ADEH is to provide a regulator with a
methodology for determining the riskfree capital requirements of a ﬁrm, conditional on their
existing portfolio. Indeed, a coherent risk measure is deﬁned as the minimum amount of
riskfree capital a portfolio requires to become acceptable to the regulator.
ADEH spawned an entire literature on coherent risk measures. These extensions include
Delbaen (2000) and Roorda, Engwerda and Schumacher (2002) who generalize the framework
to an inﬁnite dimensional state space and a multiperiod context respectively. Follmer and
Schied (2002) introduce convex risk measures that account for market frictions by allowing
risk to increase nonlinearly with portfolio size. After altering an ADEH axiom, Jarrow (2002)
enables a put option written on ﬁrm value (with zero strike price) to be coherent. Jaschke
and Kuchler (2001) study the relationship between coherent risk measures and good-deal
bounds on asset prices while Carr, Geman and Madan (2001) introduce acceptable trading
opportunities in their study of incomplete markets.
This paper introduces a risk measure that is appropriate for the portfolio selection de-
cisions of ﬁrms, while maintaining the concept of acceptable portfolios. To achieve this
objective, we deﬁne risk on portfolio holdings, a domain conducive to having diversiﬁcation
reduce portfolio risk. We maintain an axiomatic structure and deﬁne the risk of a portfolio
as its distance from the set of acceptable portfolios. More importantly, distance involves
as many components as available assets, including but not limited to riskfree capital. After
developing our risk measure, we also provide an implementation strategy involving quadratic
programming, a technique with prior applications in ﬁnance originating from portfolio the-
ory.
In contrast to coherent risk measures which focus on the regulator, this paper operates
from the ﬁrm’s perspective. In particular, we recognize that ﬁrms prefer to pursue investment
opportunities that are capable of earning excess economic rents. This desire may stem
from a perception of having superior information or investment ability. By implication,
the ambitions of ﬁrms result in portfolios that are not well diversiﬁed. Intuitively, ﬁrms are
unable to demonstrate investment skill by increasing their position in the riskfree asset. Thus,
they are adverse to adding riskfree capital to their portfolio for performance considerations,
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yet are constrained by an external regulator.
Balancing the demands of an external regulator and the performance objectives of ﬁrms
is accomplished by introducing portfolio theory into the measurement of risk. Speciﬁcally,
our proposed risk measure oﬀers ﬁrms the ability to rebalance their portfolio. During this
rebalancing, the addition of riskfree capital remains a potential option, but is not the exclu-
sive means by which a portfolio becomes acceptable. Since every asset portfolio weight may
be altered, diversiﬁcation is capable of reducing portfolio risk. Consequently, as discussed
in Merton (1998), instruments with nonlinear payoﬀs such as derivative and insurance con-
tracts become important tools for risk management. In addition, market frictions may be
incorporated into a ﬁrm’s rebalancing decisions as demonstrated in Section 4.
We also consider the pricing of portfolio insurance, a single contract whose addition to
the existing portfolio is capable of ensuring its acceptability. This contract does not reduce
positive payoﬀs but insures against negative outcomes to avoid insolvency. Provided a ﬁrm
is willing to rebalance their portfolio, only a fraction of this security is required.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 details the properties of our
proposed risk measure while a simple example which illustrates our approach is given in
Section 3. Section 4 focuses on the implementation of our risk measure and demonstrates
that coherent risk measures are contained in our framework. Section 5 considers the pricing
of portfolio insurance while the conclusion of the paper is found in Section 6.
2 Risk Measure with Diversification
Consider the time horizon [0, T ] and a ﬁnite number N of risky assets denoted xi for i =
1, . . . , N with x0 representing riskfree capital. Let P denote an M×(N+1) payoﬀ matrix with
M rows corresponding to the regulator’s set of scenarios and N + 1 columns corresponding
to the available assets. Elements of P are individual asset payoﬀs in a given scenario. A
vector of portfolio holdings η = [η0, η1, . . . , ηN ]
 represents the number of units, not dollar
amounts or fractions of a portfolio, invested in the various assets. Portfolio values Pη in
the M scenarios determine whether a portfolio complies with the demands of an external
regulator by being nonnegative, as in the ADEH literature.
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Coherent risk measures evaluate a portfolio’s risk according to its value in the worst
possible scenario or under the probability measure that produces the largest negative out-
come. Mathematically, these risk measures are deﬁned in terms of terminal portfolio values,
X = Pη, as
ρ(X) = max
i
EPi [−X|Pi ∈ P]
1 + r
(1)
with P representing a set of scenarios and r the riskfree rate of interest. In our frame-
work, EPi[−X] is replaced by Pη−i , the ith row of Pη− = −min{0, P η} as each row of Pη
corresponds to a regulator’s scenario.
It is important to emphasize that coherent risk measures do not account for diversiﬁ-
cation. Instead, they focus solely on the amount of riskfree capital required to ensure the
portfolio has nonnegative terminal values in the scenarios considered relevant by the regula-
tor. This limitation is overcome by our methodology which operates on a diﬀerent domain.
DeﬁneM⊂ RN+1 as the space of portfolio holdings with the subset of acceptable portfolios
denoted Aη ⊂M.
Definition 2.1. The set of acceptable portfolio holdings Aη ⊂M contains all portfolios that
have nonnegative outcomes, Pη ≥ 0, in all M scenarios evaluated by the regulator.
Clearly, the acceptance set Aη depends on the payoﬀ matrix P with the regulator con-
trolling the number of scenarios (rows) in which the ﬁrm must remain solvent.
Proposition 2.1. The acceptance set Aη has the following two properties:
1. Closed under multiplication by γ ≥ 0 and
2. Convexity.
Proof:
1. It must be shown that if η ∈ Aη, then γη ∈ Aη for γ ≥ 0. This property follows
from η ∈ Aη being equivalent to Pη ≥ 0 and the property P [γη] = γPη which is
nonnegative since both γ and Pη are nonnegative.
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2. Convexity is a consequence of the ﬁrst property. If η1, η2 ∈ Aη, implying Pη1 ≥ 0 and
Pη2 ≥ 0, then γη1 + (1− γ)η2 ∈ Aη for 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 since
P [γη1 + (1− γ)η2] = γPη1 + (1− γ)Pη2 ≥ 0 .
Unless each element of Pη is nonnegative, the portfolio η is unacceptable. In this instance,
an optimal acceptable η∗ is found based on its proximity to η as we assume ﬁrms prefer
to engage in as little portfolio rebalancing as possible given their initial preference for η.
Quadratic programming solves for the portfolio η∗ in Section 4.
Deﬁne a trivial acceptable portfolio ηc consisting of $1 invested only in riskfree capital,
in other words, an N + 1 vector with one as the ﬁrst element and zero in the remaining
elements. This portfolio has the property Pηc = (1 + r)1 > 0 where 1 is an N + 1 vector
of ones. Given the acceptance set Aη in Deﬁnition 2.1, portfolio risk is deﬁned in terms of
the l2 norm
1 on M. Our risk function ρ(η) maps from the domain of portfolio holdings, M,
into the nonnegative real line, ρ(η) :M→R1+.
Definition 2.2. Given Aη deﬁned by the payoﬀ matrix P , the risk of a portfolio η equals
ρ(η) = inf {||η − η′||2 : η′ ∈ Aη} .
Observe the fundamental diﬀerence between our approach and that of ADEH, instead
of deﬁning risk on terminal portfolio values, risk is deﬁned on portfolio holdings. Thus,
although both measures of risk are derived from a distance to the acceptance set, our concept
of distance has N + 1 variables (one for each asset) instead of only one (riskfree capital).
If η already comprises an acceptable portfolio, then its associated risk equals zero. For
example, the portfolio ηc has zero risk, ρ(ηc) = 0. Otherwise, portfolio risk is determined
by the amount of rebalancing a portfolio requires to become acceptable. This illustrates a
major advantage of our risk measure. A ﬁrm may rebalance their portfolio by purchasing
derivative instruments, insurance contracts, or simply reducing their exposure to certain
risky assets. The important point is that portfolio rebalancing may include, but is not
limited to, increasing the amount of riskfree capital.
The lemma below is invoked in subsequent discussions and proofs.
1The l2 norm ||x− y||2 equals
√∑N
i=0(xi − yi)2.
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Lemma 2.1. The acceptance set Aη is closed and compact.
Proof: The function ρ(η) is continuous and equals zero for acceptable portfolios that com-
prise Aη. The inverse image of a closed and compact set {0} for a continuous function is
itself closed and compact.
2.1 Properties of Risk Measure
The next proposition summarizes the properties of our risk measure. Interestingly, all but one
of ADEH’s coherence axioms are preserved. However, removal of the translation invariance
axiom results in an important generalization by eliminating the strict dependence on riskfree
capital to reduce risk. Note that the operations η1±η2 are applied componentwise to signify
operations on two vectors representing portfolio holdings.
Proposition 2.2. The proposed risk measure with diversiﬁcation has the following proper-
ties:
1. Subadditivity ρ(η1 + η2) ≤ ρ(η1) + ρ(η2)
2. Monotonicity ρ(η1) ≤ ρ(η2) if Pη1 ≥ Pη2
3. Positive Homogeneity ρ(γη) = γρ(η) for γ ≥ 0
4. Riskfree Capital Monotonicity ρ(η + γηc) ≤ ρ(η) for γ ≥ 0
5. Relevance ρ(η) > 0 if η /∈ Aη
6. Shortest Path For every η /∈ Aη and for 0 ≤ γ ≤ ||η − η∗||2,
ρ(η + γ · u˜) = ρ(η)− γ
where u˜ is the unit vector in the direction η∗− η deﬁned as η∗−η||η∗−η||2 given a portfolio η∗
that lies on the boundary of Aη and minimizes the distance ||η − η∗||2.
The proof is contained in Appendix A. The shortest path property imposes cardinality
on the risk measure with u˜ representing a unit of rebalancing. Observe that riskier portfolios
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are farther from the acceptance set with larger associated risk measures ρ(η). Versions of
the subadditivity, monotonicity, and positive homogeneity properties found in the original
ADEH paper remain with subadditivity responsible for incorporating diversiﬁcation into our
framework. The second and third properties, monotonicity and positive homogeneity, are
discussed in ADEH. Monotonicity guarantees that a portfolio whose terminal payoﬀs are
larger than another portfolio in every scenario has lower risk than its counterpart. Positive-
homogeneity allows a ﬁrm to scale an acceptable portfolio up or down with the resulting
portfolio remaining acceptable.2
The key distinction arises from ADEH’s translation invariance axiom. Our risk measure
with diversiﬁcation employs a weaker concept manifested in the riskfree capital monotonicity
and shortest path properties. The relevance property ensures the risk function is positive if
there exists a scenario, considered relevant by the regulator, where the terminal value of the
portfolio is negative. Consequently, the relevance property ensures unacceptable portfolios
have positive risk.3
2.2 Economic Motivation
An unacceptable portfolio may initially be chosen by a ﬁrm which believes it has superior
information or investment skill. Moreover, additional riskfree capital does not permit a ﬁrm
to exhibit investment ability or skill. Provided ﬁrms pursue excess economic rents and fail
to maintain well diversiﬁed portfolios, a coherent risk measure is shown in Section 4 to
overestimate their risk.
To enhance the motivation behind our risk measure, we introduce a nonnegative metric
R(η) ≥ 0 which determines the aggregate desirability of a portfolio. Since the selection
2To account for market frictions, Follmer and Schied (2002) replace positive homogeneity and subadditiv-
ity with a convexity axiom. In our framework, market frictions influence the solution for η∗ as demonstrated
in Section 4.
3When ρ(η) = 0, an amount γ∗ of riskfree capital may be removed from the portfolio according to
supγ∗ ρ(η− γ∗ηc) = 0, which is unique by the monotonicity of riskfree capital property. Since Aη is closed,
there exists a boundary point which minimizes the required amount of riskfree capital. Although quadratic
programming is capable of solving for γ∗, this issue is not elaborated on further as our focus concerns
unacceptable η portfolios.
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criteria and perceived desirability of individual assets are highly variable across ﬁrms, very
little structure is imposed on R(η). For illustration, we merely assume this function equals
R(η) =
∑N
i=0 ηi · ci∑N
i=0 ηi
(2)
where ci implicitly denotes a ranking of the assets. For example, ci may represent numerical
weightings associated with strong outperform, weak outperform, or hold among other possi-
bilities. Equation (2) allows several variables, including expected returns and variances, to
inﬂuence a portfolio’s desirability. However, covariances are not considered in equation (2)
as diversiﬁcation is reserved for our subsequent discussion of the proposed risk measure.
Regardless of the exact functional form for R(η), the ci elements may be derived from
an inﬁnite number of scenarios, not only those evaluated by the regulator. Indeed, the
regulator is primarily concerned with a small subset of extreme scenarios. In contrast, the
ﬁrm’s investment criteria is comprised of more frequently occuring scenarios. This disparity
reﬂects the diverging interests of the regulator and ﬁrm which our proposed risk measure
attempts to bridge.
In the absence of portfolio rebalancing, deﬁne the amount of additional riskfree asset
required to ensure the portfolio η becomes acceptable as α ≥ 0. This quantity equals
α = inf{γ : η + γηc ∈ Aη}
= min{0, P η} , (3)
and depends on η but is written as α rather than α(η) for notational simplicity. Overall,
for η /∈ Aη, diversiﬁcation is beneﬁcial from the ﬁrm’s perspective whenever there exists an
η′ ∈ M (not necessarily acceptable) such that
Condition 1: η + η′ ∈ Aη (4)
Condition 2: R(η + η′) ≥ R(η + αηc) . (5)
The ﬁrst condition ensures that η′, when added to η, is capable of constituting an acceptable
portfolio. A solution for η′ that satisﬁes the ﬁrst condition is provided in Section 4. The
second condition states that portfolio rebalancing is preferred to the addition of riskfree
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capital when complying with the regulator.4 The existence of a portfolio η′ is motivated by
the inability of ηc to generate excess economic rents.
5
In practice, the regulator may impose a ﬁne denoted f on ﬁrms that continue to hold un-
acceptable portfolios. Thus, the second condition expressed in equation (5) may be extended
to
R(η + η′) ≥ max {R(η + αηc), R(η)− f1{η/∈Aη}} . (6)
Assuming the ﬁne is large enough to satisfy both
1. f ≥ R(η)− R(η + αηc)
2. f ≥ R(η)− R(η + η′) ,
ﬁrms strive to be in compliance with the regulator. Indeed, the ﬁrm is better oﬀ rebal-
ancing the portfolio than adding riskfree capital or paying the ﬁne and maintaining their
original portfolio. Since R(η + η′) ≥ R(η + αηc), the two requirements above reduce to the
ﬁrst statement,
f ≥ R(η)− R(η + αηc) .
Hence, the required ﬁne is a function of both η and the ﬁrm’s aversion to adding riskfree
capital expressed via R(η). Intuitively, ﬁrms which are less adverse to holding riskfree capital
require smaller ﬁnes to induce compliance.
Observe that the addition of riskfree capital increases a portfolio’s payoﬀs in all scenar-
ios, even those for which the original portfolio already has nonnegative values. Indeed, the
portfolio payoﬀ increases in scenarios that are not even considered by the regulator. There-
fore, the addition of riskfree capital is a very conservative approach to risk management, one
suitable from the perspective of a regulator but not ﬁrms. Section 5 investigates the pricing
of portfolio insurance, a security which only increases payoﬀs in scenarios that prevent the
portfolio from being acceptable. Note that ﬁrms are able to evaluate scenarios beyond those
4Observe that setting η′ = αηc results in equality for the second condition.
5Although many other functions besides equation (2) are possible, the property ci ≥ c0 for i ≥ 1 guarantees
the second condition is satisfied.
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considered by the regulator if their internal risk management procedures are designed to be
more stringent.
The next section considers a simple example to diﬀerentiate our risk measure from co-
herent risk measures.
3 Numerical Example
Consider an economy with two risky assets and riskfree capital. Uncertainty in the economy
is captured by a coin toss. For the ﬁrst risky asset, the payoﬀ is $4 if heads and -$2 if tails,
while their counterparts are $0 and $2 respectively for the second risky asset. The rate of
interest is assumed to be zero (r = 0) implying riskfree capital is worth $1 at time T .
Asset Heads Tails
Riskfree Capital 1 1
Risky Asset #1 4 -2
Risky Asset #2 0 2
Table 1: Asset payoﬀs at time T in both scenarios.
The two risky assets are negatively correlated. Indeed, the second risky asset resembles a
“put” option on the ﬁrst risky asset. The space of portfolio holdings whose terminal values
are nonnegative in both scenarios is characterized as follows:
1 η0 + 4 η1 + 0 η2 ≥ 0 Heads (7)
1 η0 − 2 η1 + 2 η2 ≥ 0 Tails (8)
Consider the portfolio η = [1, 1, 0] consisting of one unit of riskfree capital, one unit of the
ﬁrst risky asset and none of the second. The portfolio η is not acceptable since the payoﬀ is
negative if the coin toss results in tails.
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Portfolio Heads Tails
η = [1, 1, 0] 5 -1
Table 2: Payoﬀs at time T in both scenarios for the unacceptable portfolio η.
In the coherent risk measure framework, η requires an additional unit of riskfree capital
resulting in η∗ADEH = [2, 1, 0]
.
Acceptable Portfolio - ADEH Heads Tails
η∗ADEH = [2, 1, 0]
 6 0
Table 3: Payoﬀs at time T in both scenarios for the η∗ADEH portfolio.
Solving for our optimal portfolio η∗ involves minimizing the distance between η = [1, 1, 0]
and η∗ ∈ Aη under the l2 norm using quadratic programming (QP). The portfolio η∗ equals6
[1.11, 0.78, 0.22] with details pertaining to its solution found in the next section.
Optimal Portfolio - QP Heads Tails
η∗ = [1.11, 0.78, 0.22] 4.22 0
Table 4: Payoﬀs at time T in both scenarios for the η∗ portfolio.
As demonstrated above, a coherent risk measure evaluates the risk of η as 1 due to the
negative payoﬀ when the coin toss is tails. However, the portfolio [1.11, 0.78, 0.22] ∈ Aη
implies the risk of η in our framework is
||η∗ − η||2 =
√
(1.11− 1)2 + (0.78− 1)2 + (0.22− 0)2 = 0.33.
Thus, our proposed risk measure evaluates the risk of η at one third that of a coherent risk
measure. However, the rebalanced portfolio has nonnegative payoﬀs in both scenarios and
therefore satisﬁes the regulator.
Finding more general solutions for η∗ that incorporate market frictions into the rebal-
ancing decision is addressed in Section 4. Note that our risk measure reduced the positive
portfolio payoﬀ in the heads scenario. Section 5 computes the value of a portfolio insurance
contract that eliminates negative terminal values without reducing positive terminal values.
6MATLAB code which solves for η∗ is available from the authors.
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To summarize, the example illustrates that ﬁrms may comply with the demands of a
regulator while holding less riskfree capital. Indeed, regulators may adopt our risk measure
without compromising their original role of preventing insolvency in each scenario.
4 Implementation
If Pη has any negative elements, then the regulator deems the portfolio to be unacceptable.
This section is concerned with implementing our risk measure by solving for the portfolio
η∗ ∈ Aη such that Pη∗ ≥ 0 and η∗ is “as close as possible” to the ﬁrm’s original portfolio η.
Definition 4.1. Allowing g to represent the l2 norm, the portfolio η
∗ ∈ Aη is the solution
to the optimization problem:
minη∗∈RN+1 g (η
∗ − η) (9)
subject to Pη∗ ≥ 0 .
In a ﬁnancial context, quadratic programming, implied by the l2 norm, is equivalent to the
mean-variance analysis underlying much of portfolio theory. Since the objective function g is
twice diﬀerentiable and strictly convex and the feasible region is also convex, the Kuhn Tucker
conditions imply a unique solution. Although this problem cannot be solved analytically,
very eﬃcient numerical solutions are available. In particular, the problem is well suited for
a pivoting scheme described in Luenberger (1990).
Proposition 4.1. Let y = Pη∗ and g(η∗) = 1
2
(η∗ − η)(η∗ − η). The optimal solution to
equation (9) is given by η∗ = η + Pλ where λ solves the linear complementarity conditions

y − PPλ = Pη
y ≥ 0, λ ≥ 0, λy = 0 .
(10)
Proof: The Kuhn Tucker conditions are

η∗ − Pλ = η
Pη∗ ≥ 0, λ ≥ 0, λPη∗ = 0
12
since the gradient of the objective function, g(η∗)− (Pη∗)λ, equals η∗ − η − Pλ. Hence,
with y = Pη∗, the above conditions become


y − PPλ = Pη
y ≥ 0, λ ≥ 0, λy = 0
which completes the proof.
Hence, the optimization problem in equation (9) is reduced to solving the linear comple-
mentary conditions in (10). Furthermore, the optimal portfolio η∗ is a linear function of the
vector λ which satisﬁes these linear complementary conditions. However, there may exist
multiple solutions to (10), raising the question whether all possible solutions yield the same
optimal portfolio η∗ in Deﬁnition 4.1. This issue is addressed in the following proposition
whose proof is found in appendix B.
Proposition 4.2. All solutions to the linear complementary conditions in (10) yield the
same optimal portfolio η∗ in Deﬁnition 4.1.
The λ parameters have interesting interpretations as each element corresponds to a spe-
ciﬁc regulator scenario. If the constraint Pη ≥ 0 is not binding in scenario i with (Pη)i ≥ 0,
then the corresponding λi equals 0. Otherwise, the optimal λi is a positive number repre-
senting the cost of preventing insolvency.
If Pη ≥ 0, then (10) has an obvious solution; λ = 0 and y = Pη, implying η is optimal.
Otherwise, the general pivoting approach transforms (10) to optimality. After ﬁnitely many
pivots, bounded above by the number of rows (scenarios), the vector Pη∗ is nonnegative. In
terms of computational complexity, a total of M linear equations are solved for each pivot
operation. The algorithm stops when Pη∗ ≥ 0, providing the optimal solution to (10).
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4.1 Incorporating Market Frictions
In general, the objective function g may be deﬁned with respect to a positive deﬁnite matrix
A as in (η∗ − η)A (η∗ − η). Consider a diagonal matrix of positive elements ai
A =


a0
a1
. . .
aN


representing the associated market friction (illiquidity and transaction costs) of the ith asset
as well as the ﬁrm’s unwillingness to alter their position in this asset. Larger ai values
correspond to larger penalties for altering that element of the portfolio. Even if riskfree
capital has the smallest corresponding penalty, the addition of riskfree capital may still be
sub-optimal. Indeed, a portfolio may require a large amount of additional riskfree capital to
become acceptable, but only minor modiﬁcations to positions with larger ai penalties. This
issue is re-examined in the next section when pricing portfolio insurance.
Also note that we do not incorporate the ci elements of the R(η) function from equation
(2) into A. Indeed, solving for the optimal acceptable portfolio that maximizes R(η) is well
beyond the scope of this paper and would require far greater structure on ﬁrm preferences,
information and beliefs. Since η represents the ﬁrm’s optimal portfolio in the absence of the
regulator, we merely assume any deviation from η is disliked by the ﬁrm.
Proposition 4.1 has an immediate corollary when the positive deﬁnite matrix A is inserted
into the objective function which alters the values of both η∗ and λ.
Corollary 4.1. Let y = Pη∗ and g(η∗) = 1
2
(η∗− η)A(η∗− η) where A is a positive deﬁnite
matrix. The optimal portfolio η∗ equals η + A−1Pλ, where λ satisﬁes the modiﬁed linear
complementarity conditions


y − PA−1Pλ = Pη
y ≥ 0, λ ≥ 0, λy = 0 .
Given Corollary 4.1 above, we now reconsider the example in Section 3 for diﬀerent A
matrices and their corresponding optimal acceptable portfolios.
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4.2 Continuation of Example
Once again, the original unacceptable portfolio η = [1, 1, 0] is considered. Suppose a ﬁrm is
extremely7 adverse to adding riskfree capital to their portfolio. This preference is expressed
through the matrix
A1 =


∞
1
1


which implies η∗1 equals [1, 0.75, 0.25]
. The portfolio η∗1 is acceptable with Pη
∗
1 being non-
negative in both scenarios. Therefore, our proposed risk measure generates an acceptable
portfolio without any additional riskfree capital by reducing the ﬁrm’s exposure to the ﬁrst
risky asset and purchasing a portion of the second risky asset as a hedge.
Interestingly, one may begin with the portfolio η¯ = η − ηc = [0, 1, 0] and ﬁnd η¯∗1, with
the prevailing A1 matrix, without utilizing any additional riskfree capital. Indeed, [0, 1, 1]

consists entirely of risky assets and is acceptable.
Furthermore, suppose the ﬁrm also has a strong desire to maintain their position in the
ﬁrst risky asset. Returning to the original η portfolio, the A matrix
A2 =


∞
∞
1


generates an optimal portfolio η∗2 = [1, 1, 0.50]
. As expected, only the position in the second
risky asset is modiﬁed.
Finally, we examine an A matrix capable of replicating the optimal ADEH portfolio
AADEH =


1
∞
∞


7For implementation, ∞ is replaced with a large number, 1000 in the context of the numerical examples
presented in this paper.
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which implies η∗ADEH = [2, 1, 0]
. In this situation, only additional riskfree capital is chosen.
Overall, by eliminating the possibility of rebalancing the risky assets, the ADEH risk measure
implicitly has aj =0 =∞.
The above examples illustrate the ability of our methodology to ﬁnd optimal acceptable
portfolios that reﬂect market frictions, as well as an aversion to additional riskfree capital or
altering positions in speciﬁc risky assets. In summary, implementing our framework reduces
to solving a quadratic programming problem, a situation encountered in many ﬁnancial
applications involving portfolio theory.
5 Pricing Portfolio Insurance
This section determines the price of portfolio insurance, a single contract whose combination
with the original portfolio satisﬁes the regulator.
Let IC denote the nonnegative price of the contract in circumstances where Pη contains
at least one negative value. Denote X+ = max{0, X} and X− = −min{0, X}. To become
acceptable, the ﬁrm requires a contract with a payoﬀ proﬁle equal to (Pη)−. In addition,
we ensure the portfolio, when combined with the insurance contract, continues to provide
(Pη)+ in scenarios with positive values. Thus, the insurance contract does not reduce positive
terminal values, only increases negative terminal values to zero. Hence, in contrast to riskfree
capital, portfolio insurance only provides a positive payoﬀ in scenarios where it is necessary.
We endogenously determine the value of portfolio insurance by equating the dollar value of
the optimal portfolios at time zero with and without this contract. This indiﬀerence stems
from portfolio insurance being redundant since an acceptable portfolio may be obtained
via rebalancing. Indeed, portfolio insurance provides an economically intuitive short-cut to
acceptability.
5.1 Insurance without Rebalancing
Let q denote the price vector of the N + 1 assets at time zero which is assumed to be free
of arbitrage. The proposition below solves for the price of portfolio insurance under the
assumption that no additional rebalancing is conducted after its introduction.
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Proposition 5.1. The price of the portfolio insurance, without additional portfolio rebal-
ancing, equals
ICwo = q
Pλwo
where λwo is determined by the resulting linear complementary conditions.
Proof: Consider the alternative to purchasing an insurance contract. The ﬁrm must rebal-
ance their portfolio to obtain η∗ which satisﬁes Pη∗ ≥ (Pη)+. The optimization problem
which solves for η∗ is
min
η∗
g(η∗ − η)
subject to Pη∗ ≥ (Pη)+ .
(11)
The Kuhn Tucker conditions imply that the optimal solution is given by the solution to the
following linear complementarity conditions8

y − PPλ = −(Pη)−
y ≥ 0, λ ≥ 0, λy = 0
(12)
where y = Pη∗ − (Pη)+. Denote the solution to (12) by (ηwo, λwo) where ηwo represents the
optimal portfolio without the insurance contract. The following linear relationship between
ηwo and the original portfolio η holds
ηwo = η + P
λwo . (13)
With ﬁrms indiﬀerent between buying the contract or rebalancing their portfolio, the dollar
values of the two acceptable portfolios at time zero are equated. Thus, the price of the
insurance contract equals ICwo + q
η = qηwo implying
ICwo = q
(ηwo − η) = qPλwo , (14)
which completes the proof.
The value of ICwo is positive since the payoﬀ (Pη)
− is nonnegative in each scenario and
strictly positive in at least one scenario.9
8Using the property Pη = −(Pη)− + (Pη)+, y − PPλ = −(Pη)− in equation (12) is equivalent to
Pη∗ − Pη − PPλ = 0 in Proposition 4.1.
9Pη ≥ 0 with strict inequality in at least one scenario implies the initial cost of the portfolio qη is positive.
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5.2 Insurance with Rebalancing
The following analysis has ﬁrms willing to engage in additional rebalancing to exploit the
diversiﬁcation beneﬁt oﬀered by the availability of portfolio insurance. Let the insurance
contract be the N + 2nd security resulting in an additional column being appended to P
to form Q = [P (Pη)−]. This column increases negative terminal values in scenarios that
previously implied insolvency. In addition, enhanced portfolios with and without portfolio
insurance are deﬁned as
δ1 =

η
1

 and δ0 =

η
0

 .
While δ0 is not acceptable, δ1 is acceptable since Qδ1 = Pη+(Pη)
− = (Pη)+ ≥ 0. However,
we later prove that δ1 is not optimal when there are fewer scenarios than available assets.
Proposition 5.2. The price of portfolio insurance, with additional portfolio rebalancing,
equals
ICw =
qP(λwo − λw)
((Pη)−)λw
with λwo previously determined in Proposition 5.1 and λw by the resulting linear complemen-
tary conditions.
Proof: Denote δ∗ =

ηw
xw

. The optimal solution deﬁned over the N + 2 assets is given by
min
δ∗∈RN+2
g(δ∗ − δ0)
subject to Qδ∗ ≥ (Pη)+
(15)
with linear complementarity conditions


y −QQλ = −(Pη)−
y ≥ 0, λ ≥ 0, λy = 0
(16)
The condition y ≥ 0 in (12) implies Pηwo−(Pη)+ ≥ 0 which implies that P (ηwo−η) ≥ 0 with strict inequality
in at least one scenario provided (Pη)− = 0. Therefore, no arbitrage implies ICwo = q(ηwo − η) > 0.
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for y = Qδ∗ − (Pη)+. Denote the optimal solution to (16) by (ηw, xw, λw) which implies
ηw
xw

 =

η
0

+

 P
((Pη)−)

λw . (17)
Therefore, the second equation of (17) implies the optimal amount of insurance to purchase
equals
xw = ((Pη)
−)λw ≥ 0 . (18)
Hence, conditional on additional rebalancing from η to ηw, the price of the insurance contract
is ICw · xw + qηw = qηwo which is equivalent to
ICw =
qP(λwo − λw)
((Pη)−)λw
(19)
by equation (18) and the relationship ηwo−ηw = η+Pλwo−η−Pλw = P(λwo−λw).
The magnitude of xw in equation (18) quantiﬁes the importance of diversiﬁcation. Ad-
ditional portfolio rebalancing reduces the required amount of portfolio insurance contract
from 1 to xw when P is of full row rank as proved in the following corollary.
Corollary 5.1. The optimal amount of portfolio insurance to purchase, xw, is strictly less
than one unit if P is of full row rank.
Proof: The inequality xw ≤ 1 follows from λwQQλw = λw(Pη)− by (16), which is equiv-
alent to λwPP
λw + (λ

w(Pη)
−)2 = λw(Pη)
−. When P is of full row rank, PP is positive
deﬁnite implying λwPP
λw ≥ 0 which yields (λw(Pη)−)2 ≤ λw(Pη)− and proves that
xw = λ

w(Pη)
− ≤ 1 . (20)
Thus, the optimal amount of insurance to purchase is strictly less than one unit.
The strict inequality in the above corollary reinforces the importance of diversiﬁcation.
Speciﬁcally, we are able to diversify risk more eﬀectively once the insurance contract becomes
available. With little loss of generality, we may assume the number of assets N + 1 exceeds
the number of scenarios M .10 Therefore, for the remainder of this paper, it is assumed that
P is of full row rank.
10For example, consider the total number of futures contracts and options ranging across time-to-maturities
and strike prices for scenarios involving the underlying asset.
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To summarize, it is not necessary for ﬁrms to purchase the entire insurance contract
provided they engage in subsequent portfolio rebalancing. As indicated in the next corollary,
fewer dollars are also required to be spent on portfolio insurance, a result that is later
reinforced by Proposition 5.3.
Corollary 5.2. The dollar value of required insurance is less with portfolio rebalancing,
xwICw < ICwo.
Proof: This result follows from equations (18) and (19),
xwICw = ICwo − qPλw
and the fact that the last term qPλw = q(ηw−η) is positive. Indeed, q(ηw−η) > 0 is a
consequence of the condition y = Qδ∗−(Pη)+ = Pηw+(Pη)−xw−(Pη)+ ≥ 0 from (16) which
implies Pηw + (Pη)
− − (Pη)+ ≥ 0 since 1 > xw ≥ 0. Therefore, Pηw − Pη ≥ 0 with strict
inequality in at least one scenario and by the assumption of no arbitrage, q(ηw−η) > 0.
In addition, equation (17) implies that neither δ1 nor ηwo are optimal in the presence of
the insurance contract. These statements are formalized in the following corollary.
Corollary 5.3. If η is an unacceptable portfolio and P is of full row rank, then neither
δwo =

ηwo
0

 nor δ1 =

η
1


are optimal in the presence of the insurance contract.
Proof: If δwo is acceptable, then it is also acceptable in the presence of the insurance contract.
But if δwo is optimal, then (13) and (17) jointly imply that
P(λwo − λw) = 0 and ((Pη)−)λw = 0 .
Hence, with the payoﬀ matrix P being of full row rank, it follows that λwo = λw with
(12) implying λwoPP
λwo = 0 which contradicts PP being positive deﬁnite since (Pη)−
is strictly greater than 0 in at least one scenario. Hence δwo is not optimal. A similar
contradiction is obtained if one assumes δ1 is optimal.
The next proposition states that the two portfolio insurance prices, ICwo and ICw, are
identical when the market is arbitrage free.
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Proposition 5.3. If η is an unacceptable portfolio, then the prices ICwo and ICw are equal.
Proof: The binding property of the constraints in equations (11) and (15) imply


Pηwo = Pη + (Pη)
−
Pηw + (Pη)
−xw = Pη + (Pη)−.
It follows that η plus the insurance contract, ηwo and δ
∗ =

ηw
xw

 all have the same payoﬀ,
Pη + (Pη)−. By no arbitrage, their values at time zero are also equal with


qηwo = q
η + ICwo
qηw + ICw · xw = qη + ICw
implying ICwo − ICw = qηwo − qηw − ICw · xw = 0 which completes the proof.
In summary, prices for portfolio insurance without portfolio rebalancing and with port-
folio rebalancing are given by Propositions 5.1 and 5.2 respectively. Additional portfolio
rebalancing exploits the diversiﬁcation beneﬁt oﬀered by the introduction of the insurance
contract. As a result, the ﬁrm is able to purchase strictly less than one unit of the contract.
However, with or without portfolio rebalancing, the price for one unit of portfolio insurance
is identical according to Proposition 5.3. More intuition behind Proposition 5.3 is given in
the next subsection.
5.3 Insurance and Dollar-Denominated Risk
We now demonstrate that although the risk metric ρ(η) is deﬁned on portfolio weights, our
results may be interpreted in terms of a dollar-denominated quantity. Furthermore, the
dollar-denominated amount of rebalancing equals the price of portfolio insurance.
Speciﬁcally, the diﬀerence between η∗ and η equals η∗ − η = P Tλ implying the dollar-
denominated amount of risk is
qT (η∗ − η) = qTP Tλ (21)
= ICwo .
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Therefore, although risk is deﬁned in terms of the l2 norm on portfolio weights, it may
be converted into the more traditional dollar-based domain and coincides with the price of
portfolio insurance (with or without rebalancing).
As a consequence of equation (21), minimizing the distance in portfolio weights between
η and the acceptance set is equivalent to minimizing the dollar-denominated amount of
rebalancing. Therefore, the price of portfolio insurance equals the amount of rebalancing, in
dollars, required to ensure the portfolio η becomes acceptable.
5.4 Example Revisited
Returning to the example in Section 3, let the price vector equal q = [1, 1.3, 0.9]. Existing
speciﬁcations imply (Pη)− = [0, 1], and η = [1, 1, 0] along with the payoﬀ matrix P
illustrates the results in Propositions 5.1 and 5.2. The vector λwo equals [0.0673, 0.1635]

implying a price for portfolio insurance of ICwo = q
Pλwo which equals $0.45. The λwo
parameters are associated with two restrictions; preventing negative terminal values and not
reducing positive terminal values.
The second optimization in equation (15) based on δ0 and Q yields λw = [0.0579, 0.1405]
.
According to Proposition 5.2, the price ICw equals $0.45, in accordance with Proposition
5.3.
However, the optimal amount of portfolio insurance to purchase is xw = λ

w(Pη)
− =
(λw)2 = 0.1405, a quantity strictly less than one since P is of full row rank. Thus, with
additional portfolio rebalancing, the dollar-denominated reduction in the amount of portfolio
insurance that is required equals ICwo − xwICw = (1− 0.1405)× $0.45 = $0.39.
6 Conclusion
A risk measure deﬁned on the space of portfolio holdings is proposed which enables diversiﬁ-
cation to reduce portfolio. Consequently, derivative and insurance contracts have important
roles in risk management. Through portfolio rebalancing, our risk measure oﬀers ﬁrms
greater ﬂexibility than coherent risk measures when complying with an external regulator.
Indeed, our approach allows every asset in the portfolio, including riskfree capital, to be
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adjusted. Thus, as in the existing literature, risk is deﬁned as the distance to an acceptance
set. However, to incorporate diversiﬁcation, the concept of distance is extended to include
the risky assets as well as riskfree capital.
Our analysis incorporates market frictions such as illiquidity and transaction costs into
the portfolio rebalancing decision. The price of portfolio insurance is also derived. When
combined with the original portfolio, this contract ensures nonnegative portfolio values in
every scenario considered by the regulator. Furthermore, the amount of required portfo-
lio insurance is determined by the ﬁrm’s willingness to rebalance their portfolio once this
contract is available.
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Appendices
A Proof of Proposition 2.2
Recall the properties of Proposition 2.1 regarding the acceptance set Aη.
1. Consider two portfolios η1 and η2 and let η
∗
1 be the closest portfolio on the acceptance
set Aη. In other words, η∗1 = η′ such that inf {||η1 − η′||2 : η′ ∈ Aη}. Similarly deﬁne
η∗2 as the equivalent quantity for η2. Therefore, by deﬁnition
ρ(η1) = ||η1 − η∗1||2
ρ(η2) = ||η2 − η∗2||2
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and the following holds by the triangle inequality property of norms
||η1 + η2 − η∗1 − η∗2||2 ≤ ||η1 − η∗1||2 + ||η2 − η∗2||2 = ρ(η1) + ρ(η2).
However, the quantity η∗1 + η
∗
2 is also in the acceptance set since Aη is convex and
closed under multiplication by γ ≥ 0. For two portfolios η∗1, η∗2 ∈ Aη convexity implies
η∗ = 1
2
η∗1 +
1
2
η∗2 ∈ Aη while 2η∗ = η∗1 + η∗2 ∈ Aη as a consequence of Aη being closed
under multiplication of positive scalars. Therefore
ρ(η1 + η2) ≤ ||η1 + η2 − η∗1 − η∗2||2 = ||(η1 + η2)− (η∗1 + η∗2)||2
since η∗1 + η
∗
2 is an element of Aη but need not be optimal. Hence, ρ(η1 + η2) ≤
ρ(η1) + ρ(η2) and subadditivity is proved.
2. Consider two portfolios η1 and η2 and let Pη1 ≥ Pη2 a.s. The proof for monotonicity
follows by recognizing that η1 = η1−η2+η2 and ρ(η1−η2) = 0 since the portfolio η1−η2
always generates a nonnegative payoﬀ implying η1− η2 ∈ Aη. Applying subadditivity,
ρ(η1) = ρ(η1 − η2 + η2) ≤ ρ(η2), demonstrates that ρ(η1) ≤ ρ(η2) and monotonicity is
proved.
3. Consider a portfolio η and a scalar γ ≥ 0. Deﬁne η∗ as in the proof of subadditivity.
The function ρ(η) is deﬁned as ||η − η∗||2 which implies that
γρ(η) = γ ||η − η∗||2 = ||γη − γη∗||2 ≥ ||γη − (γη)∗||2 = ρ(γη)
since γη∗ is in the acceptance set but need not be optimal in terms of minimizing the
distance to the acceptable set. The reverse direction is proved by deﬁning ρ(γη) as
||γη − (γη)∗||2 = γ
∣∣∣∣∣∣η − (γη)∗γ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
≥ γρ(η) since 1
γ
(γη)∗ is an element of Aη but need not
be optimal. Thus, ρ(γη) and γρ(η) are equal and positive homogeneity is proved.
4. Consider two portfolios η1 and η2 that diﬀer only in terms of the riskfree asset with
η2,0 > η1,0. It suﬃces to show that ρ(η2) ≤ ρ(η1). Consider a portfolio that is a
combination of η1 and another portfolio γηc for γ ∈ [0, 1] that consists entirely of an
amount η2,0−η1,0 in riskfree capital. This new portfolio is equivalent to η2 and implies
that
η2 = η1 + γηc ⇒ ρ(η2) = ρ(η1 + γηc) ≤ ρ(η1) + ρ(γηc)
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using subadditivity. However, ρ(γηc) equals zero since this portfolio is accepted by the
regulator, γηc ∈ Aη. Hence, ρ(η2) ≤ ρ(η1) and the monotonicity of riskfree capital is
proved.
5. Consider a portfolio η /∈ Aη such that Pη−i < 0 for some i. It must be proved that
ρ(η) > 0. Proceed by contradiction by supposing that ρ(η) = 0 which implies that
η ∈ Aη by Deﬁnition 2.2. However, Deﬁnition 2.1 requires that Pη ≥ 0 for η ∈ Aη,
contradicting Pη−i < 0 for any i. Hence, relevance is proved.
6. Consider a portfolio η that does not belong to the acceptance set. Recall that Aη is a
closed and convex set according to Lemma 2.1 and Proposition 2.1. Since η is a point
outside this set, by the separating hyperplane theorem, there exists a point η∗ on the
boundary of Aη such that ||η − η∗||2 is the unique minimum distance of η from set
Aη. Now consider any scaler γ and let u˜ be the unit directional vector in the direction
η∗ − η. The vector η + γ · u˜ is a point along the path of minimum distance and proves
the shortest path property.
ρ (η + γ · u˜) = ||η + γ · u˜− η∗||2
=
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣ η + γ ·
(
η∗ − η
||η − η∗||2
)
− η∗
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣
2
=
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣η∗ − η − γ ·
(
η∗ − η
||η − η∗||2
)∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣
2
=
(
1− γ||η − η∗||2
)
||η − η∗||2
= ||η − η∗||2 − γ
= ρ(η)− γ .
B Proof of Proposition 4.2
It is suﬃcient to prove that any two solutions to the linear complementary conditions in (10)
yield the same optimal portfolio η∗. Therefore, our procedure is optimal. Let (y1, λ1) and
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(y2, λ2) denote two solutions to (10) with the following conditions


y1 − PPλ1 = Pη
y2 − PPλ2 = Pη
λ1 ≥ 0, λ2 ≥ 0, y1 ≥ 0, y2 ≥ 0
λ1 y1 = 0, λ

2 y2 = 0 .
(22)
We proceed to show
Pλ1 = Pλ2
with both solutions generating the same optimal portfolio η∗ = η + Pλi for i = 1, 2. From
(22),


λ1 Pη = −λ1 PPλ1
λ2 Pη = −λ2 PPλ2 .
Therefore,
(λ1 + λ2)
(y1 + y2) = λ

1 y2 + λ

2 y1
= λ1 PP
λ2 + λ

2 PP
λ1 + λ

1 Pη + λ

2 Pη
= −(λ1 − λ2)PP(λ1 − λ2)
≤ 0 .
Since λ1 ≥ 0, λ1 ≥ 0, y1 ≥ 0, and y2 ≥ 0, it follows that
(λ1 − λ2)PP(λ1 − λ2) = 0
which implies
P(λ1 − λ2) = 0 .
Therefore, the optimal solution to equation (9) is
η∗ = η + Pλ1 = η + Pλ2 ,
which completes the proof.
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